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Abstract 
During the last decades, private placements have become the preferred approach for issuing 
equity on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), despite its discriminatory nature. With a sample 
consisting of 95 events (private placements) across 73 different companies between January 
2012 and January 2020, our introductory results show a statistically significant negative stock 
price reaction to a private placement announcement. This is contrary to former research 
explaining positive announcement returns with the monitoring and certification hypothesis. 
Our thesis contributes to the existing literature by primarily exploring two aspects of private 
placements. In the first part, we investigate whether the announcement returns align with the 
anticipated price depreciation based on the discount and dilution set in the offering. Any 
discrepancies between the two must signal other information from the market. We find that 
for every 1% increase in the implied price depreciation, the issuer on average reports an 
announcement return of -2.329%. This can be perceived as an indirect cost related to the 
offering. For the shareholders, and thus, the regulatory body (Oslo Børs), the results are 
important because they indicate an adverse effect on non-participating shareholders’ returns. 
In the second part, we test whether the announcement of a subsequent repair issue impacts the 
issuer announcement returns. Repair issues are, to our knowledge, a Norwegian phenomenon 
that is not observed in other markets. It aims to compensate non-participating shareholders for 
the discrimination in the private placement and is deemed as an important element in the 
approval of the private placement by Oslo Børs. Our results show that when firms announce a 
private placement without a repair issue, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is negative. When 
issuers announce a subsequent repair issue, CAR is negative but 2.68% higher. Indicating that 
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Raising capital is a crucial part of most firms’ life cycles, and has extensive implications for 
management, shareholders, and other stakeholders alike. Thus, it is an interesting event that 
deserves proper research and scrutiny. The regulatory and financial landscape can vary greatly 
between countries. Subsequently, there is a demand for research adapted to specific equity 
markets. In the last two decades, a surge in private placements has emerged on Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE). In 2019, 94.7% of all seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on OSE were 
conducted through a private placement. In contrast to other types of SEOs, private placements 
offer shares to specific shareholders and waive non-participating shareholders’ preemptive 
rights. The extensive use of private placements on OSE has received some attention in the 
Norwegian media and is described as “unfortunate” by emeritus professor Thore Johnsen 
(Elvevold, 2019). However, in recent years, surprisingly little research has been conducted on 
the Norwegian equity market. 
How firms should raise capital has been a widely discussed topic for several decades. One of 
the most influential theories argues that in perfect capital markets shareholders are indifferent 
to the firm’s capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1965). Later research contradicts this 
perspective and claims that it is preferable for shareholders if the firm first uses retained 
earnings, thereafter debt, and, finally, new equity to finance investment opportunities (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). Issuing equity can also be perceived as a signal of firm value, and thus, be 
an example of information asymmetries between shareholders and management. Implying that 
corporate management issues equity when the firm is overvalued (Ross, 1977). 
In this thesis, we approach the decision to issue equity holistically, by accounting for 
Norwegian regulatory conditions, and the perspectives of both shareholders and corporate 
management. Our research contributes to understanding the premises that underpin the 
rationale for choosing private placements over rights and public offers in Norway. 
Furthermore, we investigate the regulatory and legislative environment that influences the 
choice of issuing equity through a private placement. To provide sufficient background, we 
discuss relevant literature in section two, combined with insights from a corporate finance 
professional at Norne Securities. Here we find that the regulatory framework in Norway 
contributes to making private placements an advantageous approach compared to rights or 
public offers. In section three we introduce our hypotheses, and the methodologies used to test 
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the hypotheses are depicted in section four. In section five we present descriptive statistics of 
our sample, consisting of 95 private placements across 73 different firms between January 
2012 and January 2020. Of the 95 private placements, 43 include an announcement of a 
subsequent repair issue, while 52 do not announce a subsequent repair issue.  
Our results are described in section six. Introductory, we investigate whether the 
announcement of a private placement is reflected in the market through the issuer 
announcement returns. We find that the private placements on average report negative 
announcement returns. The negative announcement returns hold true across two different 
estimation methods (The Single Index Model and The Constant Mean Model) and for different 
event window lengths. This result contradicts contemporary research that reports positive 
announcement returns for private placements (Wruck, 1989). 
We further divide section six into two main parts. In the first part we test our first research 
question, that is, whether the observed return following a private placement announcement is 
different than the expected announcement return. This question is answered by performing 
cross-sectional regressions with the announcement returns as a dependent variable and the 
implied price change (hereafter referred to as the theoretical price fall) as an independent 
variable. We find that the announcement returns are lower than implied by the dilution and 
discount set in the offering. Hence, we argue that the negative market reaction can be perceived 
as an indirect cost related to the offering. For the shareholders, and thus, the regulatory body 
(Oslo Børs), the results are important because they indicate an adverse effect on non-
participating shareholders’ returns emanating from the characteristics of the offering. 
Our second question investigates if an announcement of a subsequent repair issue impacts the 
issuers’ announcement return. Again, we perform cross-sectional regressions, however, we 
now attempt to estimate the effect from the repair issue announcement. Thus, we design an 
interaction variable where the announcement of a repair issue (dummy variable) is multiplied 
with the theoretical price fall. We find that the firms that announce a repair issue report higher 
announcement returns than those who do not. Thus, our findings indicate that the repair issue 
has value for all shareholders since it influences the announcement return positively.  
The results have important implications for shareholders, corporate management, and the 
regulatory body concerning Norwegian SEOs. Shareholders and regulators should be 
particularly observant of the inherent discrimination in a private placement, rather than if a 
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subsequent repair issue is announced. From a corporate management perspective, the negative 
announcement returns can be perceived as an indirect flotation cost that should influence both 




2. Background  
The first section elucidates the scope and central concepts motivating the analysis. An 
understanding of fundamental corporate finance concepts is important in relation to the 
empirical research presented in this section. Thus, essential theories and legal characteristics 
regarding corporate equity issuance are elaborated on in the following sections. Moreover, the 
sections debate previous findings on private placements, their implications for shareholder 
returns, and their relevance and shortcomings with respect to the Norwegian equity market. 
Overall, the section attempts to present important concepts and relate them to the empirical 
research, exhibiting the importance of our research from a corporate, individual, and 
institutional perspective.  
2.1 Capital structure  
Private companies that intend to realize capital-intensive business plans are oftentimes 
dependent on raising capital through issuing equity or debt. The motives for a security offering 
(i.e., equity issuance) can vary but are commonly connected with new investment 
opportunities or capital expenditures. Alternative reasons explored in empirical literature are 
re-financing, M&A, and the exploitation of cheap financing through historically low costs 
(Eckbo, 2007). When a firm issues equity, the number of shares increases, consequently the 
existing shareholders face dilution. Isolated, the dilutive effect reduces the value per share, 
however, the proceeds from issuing equity increase the firm’s cash balance and offset the 
dilutive effect. Thus, an existing shareholder is theoretically indifferent to whether a firm 
issues equity, if priced correctly.  
Alternatively (to equity issuance), firms can raise debt, oftentimes through the issuance of a 
bond. By taking on debt, shareholders avoid dilution, but increasing debt levels may be 
associated with higher bankruptcy risk. Additionally, bondholders require priority over 
shareholders’ claims on future cash flows to secure that the firm meets its debt obligation. 
Thus, according to the irrelevance theorem conceptualized by Modigliani and Miller (1965), 
shareholders are indifferent to the firm’s capital structure, under a strict set of assumptions. 
However, the conditions underlying the irrelevance proposition typically do not hold, due to, 




Information asymmetries are best described as a situation where corporate management 
(insiders) has superior information compared to investors (outsiders). Hence, the signaling 
hypothesis proposed by Ross (1977) argues that managers can signal firm value through 
capital structure decisions. In such instances, an adverse selection problem arises, where the 
offering of equity causes shareholders to believe that corporate managers perceive the firms 
as overvalued. Consequently, the share price drops if the firm issues equity. Thus, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) introduce the pecking-order theory, suggesting that investment opportunities 
should (if possible) be financed primarily by the retention of earnings (internal funds), 
secondly by debt, and last by issuing equity.  
2.2 Agency issues 
The corporate management and board of directors (agents) are representatives authorized to 
act on the behalf of their shareholders (principal). Thus, the motives for corporate managers 
should be to create value for all shareholders by, first and foremost, maximizing the firms’ 
profitability. However, a contradictory view was introduced in 1976 with the principal-agent 
theory. It suggests that if an agent (managers) is engaged to perform certain activities on behalf 
of the principal (shareholder), misalignment of incentives might arise. Thus, if both parties are 
maximizing utility, there is reason to presume that the management does not necessarily act in 
the best interest of its shareholders. The costs arising from such relationships are defined as 
agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Regarding private placements, we find that a more relevant agency conflict is between large 
and small shareholders. Based on our discussion with Norne Securities, we are under the 
impression that most of the shares issued in a private placement are picked up by large, existing 
shareholders rather than outside investors. Thus, an agency conflict arises between small and 
large shareholders, as large shareholders are prioritized when management issues equity 
through private placements. 
We find the principal-agent theory relevant since management is expected to act in the best 
interest of all shareholders when issuing equity, not solely the large shareholders. Thus, any 




2.3 Seasoned Equity Offerings - SEOs 
For privately-owned companies a common approach is to raise equity capital through a public 
listing, also known as an Initial Public Offering (IPO). Post-IPO, there are three predominant 
approaches to issue additional equity: Public offerings, rights offers, and private placements.  
 








Such offerings are delineated as a follow-on or SEO and the new shares are often subscribed 
to at a discount to the prevailing market price. In public offers, shares are sold to investors in 
the open market, including both existing and new shareholders. Rights offers, on the other 
hand, exclusively offer shares to existing shareholders on a pro-rata basis. Shareholders who 
do not want to participate in the rights issue can sell their rights. Finally, private placements 
earmark the issuance to a targeted group of existing shareholders and occasionally one or 
several new investors. 
2.4 Flotation costs 
Managers’ rationale for choosing between different SEO approaches can vary amongst firms, 
industries, and countries. An intuitive motivation is however to minimize the costs related to 
SEO. Albeit important, the interpretation of costs related to equity issuance is not necessarily 
straightforward, particularly for public companies. Costs related to SEOs are described as 
Public offer      
Shares are sold in the 
open market  
 
 
Seasoned Equity Offerings – SEOs 
Rights offer      
Shares are sold pro-rata 
to existing shareholders  
 
 
Private placement  
Shares are sold to 
specific shareholders - 





flotation costs, which are divided into direct and indirect flotation costs. The direct costs 
include financial (i.e., underwriting fees), legal and registration fees. Indirect costs, however, 
can be more challenging to measure. Empirically most indirect costs come from underpricing 
costs related to selling new shares at a discount compared to the current or prior trading day 
closing price. Another debated indirect cost is a potential negative stock price announcement 
effect from SEOs. Finally, management time and efforts, and the risk related to potential 
delays or cancellations are other indirect costs (Eckbo, 2007). 
 







However, flotation costs are not homogenous across countries. For instance, as the primary 
method for SEOs in the Norwegian market is private placements, guaranteed SEOs (by the 
investment bank) are seldom needed. Thus, there are rarely any underwriting fees related to 
SEOs in Norway, whilst in the US, underwriting fees are a major component of most SEOs. 
Furthermore, regulatory requirements and time horizons related to SEOs vary between 
countries (Eckbo, 2007). 
There are also inherent differences between the regulatory requirements for distinct SEOs 
within Norway. For rights and public offerings, a listing and offering prospectus is required. 
This is usually drafted as one document and hereafter referred to as “the prospectus”. The 
prospectus must contain all relevant information about the issuer and the offering itself and is 
commonly drafted by a legal or financial advisor (or a combination of the two). Thus, the 
prospectus is the main direct flotation cost related to SEOs in Norway. In a rights offer, the 
subscription rights must be publicly available for a minimum period of 14 days (the 
Direct costs 
• Financial fees 
• Legal fees 
• Registration fees 
Indirect costs 
• Discount 
• Stock return 
• Time & risk 
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subscription period) when listing on the OSE. This creates a risk that the share price might 
decrease during the subscription period and makes the offering less attractive for investors. 
Thus, there are substantial direct and indirect costs related to rights and public issues, 
compared to private placements (Tønnesen, 2021). Due to the higher costs, rights and public 
offerings become less desirable, particularly if the issuer intends to raise the proceeds through 
an expeditious process with low costs.  
 
Table 2.4  – Requirements for rights issues and private placements in Norway 
Requirements Rights issue Private placement 
Offering prospectus ✓ Yes No – if < 150 participators 
Listing prospectus ✓ Yes, but often a part of 
the offering prospectus 
No - if < 20% shares outstanding is 
issued 
Investor presentation ✓ Yes Yes - usually 
Subscription period ✓ Yes, 14 days subscription 
period 
No – can be carried out within 
hours 
Subscription rights ✓ Yes No 
Shareholder preferential rights ✓ Yes No 
Guaranteed issue ✓ Yes, usually shareholders No, usually not necessary 
 
 
Finally, costs and regulatory frameworks can vary significantly between markets. Thus, the 
empirical evidence from other markets should be interpreted cautiously before drawing 
conclusions regarding the Norwegian market. The specifics of the Norwegian equity market 
are further elaborated on in later sections.  
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2.5 SEOs - announcement returns 
Share issues, and thus SEOs are primarily analyzed as a sale of shares at a pre-determined 
price, i.e., the subscription price. If the subscription price is equal to the observed market value, 
then there is no creation or depreciation of value, and existing shareholders are neither better 
nor worse off. If the subscription price is at a premium to the market value, then the firm 
benefits from cheap financing (Vernimmen & Dallocchio, 2014). However, oftentimes the 
subscription price is set at a discount to the prevailing market price to attract investors to 
participate in the offering, leading to a decrease in firm value and lower price per share for the 
existing shareholders. In this thesis, we define this effect as the theoretical price fall, which is 
further elaborated on in section 5.3.3. 
Vast research has been conducted on equity issuance, and particularly on the stock 
announcement effects following SEOs. The observed announcement effect is oftentimes 
negative, but some researchers have argued that this is a US-related phenomenon (Eckbo, 
2007). In fact, a recent meta-study finds that across 78 different event studies on SEO 
announcement returns, the average abnormal return is 0.82%. Regarding private placements, 
Holderness assesses 26 studies, and the average abnormal return is 3.1% (Holderness, 2018). 
Holderness relates the positive announcement returns to shareholder approval of private 
placements. However, another explanation could be that the private placement signals that the 
firm will invest in positive NPV projects or avoid financial distress. 
Thus, the notion that SEOs cause negative announcement returns is debatable. Though 
interesting, we are skeptical to take this observation at face value since there are several 
methodological dissimilarities amongst previous event studies, such as event window length 
and number of observations. Additionally, the existing research is to a varying extent recent, 
thus, it is challenging to be conclusive as the regulatory frameworks from two-three decades 
ago might not be representative of the current environment in the respective markets.  
As we will further elaborate on in section 2.7.4, Holderness (2018) identifies obvious 
inconsistencies across markets regarding shareholder approval and show that this decision has 
an impact on announcement returns. And herein lies one of the key implications for our 
research: As the framework for SEOs are different across markets, there is a need to 
understand the inherent legislative, regulatory, and practical structure that set the premise for 
SEOs when investigating announcement returns. Finally, one can draw implications from the 
10 
 
announcement returns and compare them with those in other markets if these premises are 
recognized.  
2.6 Private placements  
Compared to public and rights offers, private placements are a less expensive approach to 
raising capital in the Norwegian market. Firstly, a prospectus and listing of subscription rights 
are not required. Secondly, the time horizon is advantageous for private placements compared 
to the two other approaches. 
In a private placement, the financial advisor (i.e., investment bank/brokerage firm) has placing 
power, and usually contacts large existing shareholders, customers, and other potential 
investors (Tønnesen, 2021). The financial advisor commonly has a network of investors that 
can participate in a private placement, which mitigates the risk related to securing desired 
proceeds (Bang-Hansen & Rogdaberg, 2012). Usually, the intention to raise capital through a 
private placement is announced after the market closes to avoid any market price disruption 
whilst placing the offering. The announcement typically contains certain details regarding the 
offer such as an estimated range of shares issued, subscription price, and the intended use of 
the proceeds. Before market opening the following trading day, the issuer posts a second stock 
exchange announcement with the final details of the completed private placement (Tønnesen, 
2021). The number of individual investors participating in a private placement varies but is 
generally less than 150 to avoid the prospectus requirement. 
To attract investors, the offering shares are usually subscribed at a discount to the prevailing 
market price. Thus, participators in private placements can increase their ownership in the firm 
at a lower price than existing shareholders who were not invited to participate. Hence, non-
participating shareholders face dilution and a lower share price. Aligning with the irrelevance 
proposition, investors are conceptually indifferent to a private placement settled in cash at the 
market value since the proceeds offset the dilutive effect. However, since the subscription 
price is at a discount to the prevailing market price, the implied firm value should decrease as 
the relative size of the issue and discount increase.  
11 
 
2.6.1 Literature on private placements 
The positive announcement reaction to private placements observed in several studies 
(Holderness, 2018) is interesting because it portrays an opposing reaction compared to our 
economic intuition. Assuming that the subscription price in most private placements is at a 
discount, we would expect (ceteris paribus) that the announcement reactions on average are 
negative due to the value reduction per share. 
Researchers have argued that the positive announcement reactions are related to the investor(s) 
involved in a private placement. If the investor(s) subscribing to the offering becomes an active 
partner in the issuing company, this can increase monitoring which leads to reduced agency 
issues and improved allocation of corporate resources. Thus, the monitoring hypothesis 
suggests that private placements have a positive impact on firm value and a 4.5% abnormal 
announcement return (Wruck, 1989). A similar study on smaller firms also documents positive 
announcement returns, arguing that the certification of value provided by an investment from 
a professional investor (i.e., institutional investor) fuels the positive announcement return 
(Hertzel & Smith, 1993).   
In a later study Hertzel et al., (2002) find that firms offering equity through a private placement 
significantly underperforms in the long run, despite the positive announcement return. They 
believe that the investors participating in a private placement are too optimistic about the long-
term prospects of the issuing firm. Additionally, Krishnamurthy et al., (2004) find that non-
participating shareholders experience long-term negative returns, while both the 
announcement- and long-term return are significantly higher for participating investors.  
Furthermore, contemporary research has debated whether the monitoring and certification 
hypotheses in fact explain most private placements. By examining larger samples, Barclay et 
al., (2007) make the case that most private placements are made to passive investors. Thus, 
private placements might solidify managements’ control of the firm, consequently enforcing 
management entrenchment (Barclay et al., 2007).   
The aforementioned literature and its relevance for Norwegian SEOs are further discussed in 
relation to our results in section 6. 
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2.7 The Norwegian equity market 
The OSE is a rather small marketplace compared to larger markets such as the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and London Stock Exchange (LSE). The large governmental 
ownership in individual companies distinguishes OSE from other markets. The government 
holds majority stakes in several of the largest firms, such as Equinor (67.0%), Hydro (34.3%), 
DNB (34.0%), and Yara (36.2%). Further, the dominance of energy and industrial firms is 
another observable trait of the OSE. These characteristics result in a market that is more 
sensitive to global sentiment, and especially changes in oil prices. However, during the last 
decade, Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) - the main index on the OSE – yield 
a cumulative return (log-return) of 75.85% with a compounded annual growth rate of 5.81%. 
 














2.7.1 Issuing equity on OSE  
The predominant approach for equity issues in the Norwegian market is through private 
placements. As depicted in Figure 2.7.1, the dominance of private placements has increased 
in recent years and they comprise approximately 95% of all equity issuances in the Norwegian 
market in 2019. Further, we notice the large increase in the total number of equity issuances, 
depicting a definite rise in the level of activity and, thus, equity financing at Oslo Børs. 
 
Figure 2.7.1  – Annual number of equity issuances in the Norwegian equity market 
 
Source: Oslo Børs 
 
Interestingly, the dominance of private placements in the Norwegian equity market is a 
divergence from comparable markets such as the Swedish market, where private placements 
in 2016 amounted to less than 15% of all SEOs (Holderness, 2016). This discrepancy between 
the Norwegian and the Swedish market is not the exception, but rather the rule. Hence, whilst 
in most markets, the dominant approach for issuing equity is through rights issues and/or 
public offers (Holderness, 2018), the Norwegian market is an abnormality where private 
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2.7.2 The equal treatment principle 
Critical for the equal treatment of all shareholders and the protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests is the rule of equal treatment. According to section 5-14 of the Norwegian Securities 
Trading Act (“STA”) all shareholders of public companies must be treated on an equal basis. 
Individual holders or third parties can therefore not be provided with any unreasonable 
advantage at the expense of other existing shareholders. However, Section 5-14 does provide 
a certain flexibility where differential treatment may be acceptable if the issuer can justify that 
it is in the common interest of the issuer and its shareholders. The issuing company is therefore 
obliged to justify the inherent differential treatment private placements have on shareholders, 
by weighing the disadvantages of dilution and change in ownership structure with the potential 
advantage(s) (proportionality) (Børs, n.d.). 
Oslo Børs is the regulatory body that approves equity issuances and, thus, the issuers’ 
approach for equity issuance. The documentation is on the other hand delegated to the issuer 
and then reviewed by Oslo Børs. This is primarily done because documentation and 
controlling of details are both time-consuming and associated with large costs. In addition, 
Oslo Børs relies on the issuers’ more in-depth industry knowledge in its assessment of the 
equal treatment principle, which is also why Oslo Børs will typically not set their own 
judgment before the issuer’s assessment. Interference and re-examination from Oslo Børs are 
only undertaken in cases where differential treatment clearly lacks a proper justification or 
complaints are received. Only on two previous occasions have Oslo Børs imposed sanctions 
for breaches of the equal treatment principle: Oslo Børs Board decision of 25 June 2003 and 
Stock Exchange Appeals Committee Case 2/2006 (Børs, n.d.). 
The evaluation of proportionality goes back to the definition of common interest. Oslo Børs 
defines common interest as follows: “a long-term interest in the company’s financial 
performance, and the objective return for shareholders on their investment in the company” 
(Børs, n.d.). Thus, to assess whether an action is of common interest, the long-term effects 
should be accounted for, including the purpose for raising capital.  
As mentioned in section 2.1, private placements can take place as a consequence of an acute 
liquidity crisis, financial distress, a wish to finance a business opportunity, or in order to take 
advantage of favorable market conditions. These situations separate whether a company needs 
or wants to raise capital, and therefore also the risk incurred by existing and/or new 
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shareholders. As the risks are high in situations such as a liquidity crisis or financial distress, 
typically a higher discount is offered and, thus, a larger number of shares are issued to raise 
the required capital.  
In concern to private placements, Oslo Børs has therefore stated a stricter requirement for a 
factual justification in situations where an issue is offered at a substantial discount relative to 
the market price and/or a large share issue representing a significant dilution. This is 
particularly relevant when the issue leads to a change in the balance of power. Issuing equity 
in a situation of financial distress will rationally lead to a stronger dilutive effect on its 
shareholders as a higher discount and larger issue size is necessary to attract the same amount 
of capital, and will, therefore, fall under stricter requirements for approval. However, offering 
equity when financially distressed is usually in the best interest of all shareholders as the 
alternative might be bankruptcy. It would be harder to justify an issue with a significant 
discount (or a discount at all) if the issuer seeks to finance a business opportunity or have no 
particular purpose to raise capital other than favorable market conditions. In these cases, 
typically a low discount and a small number of shares are issued to represent less than 20% of 
the issuer’s capital in order to avoid the requirement of a listing prospectus. 
Regardless of the issuer’s situation, Oslo Børs requires issuers to assess other alternatives, 
which potentially have less adverse effects on existing shareholders. If the same advantages 
of a private placement can be provided at a smaller expense of non-participating shareholders 
with an alternative approach, this approach should be executed. It is stated that this 
consideration plays a central role in Oslo Børs’ decision to greenlight the issue.  
2.7.3 Repair issues 
Private placements can be followed up by a repair issue targeting non-participating 
shareholders to effectively reduce dilution. Repair issues are, to our knowledge, a Norwegian 
phenomenon that is not observed in other markets. Effectively, the issuer offers shares to 
existing shareholders who were not invited to participate in the private placement, in order to 
minimize the disadvantage of being excluded from the private placement. This typically takes 
place a few days after completion of the private placement. A repair issue is offered at the 




As issuers seek to minimize the differential treatment by offering a repair issue, it may be 
significant for the evaluation of factual justification, including the requirement of 
proportionality. Thus, following up on a private placement with a repair issue appears to be a 
requirement from Oslo Børs to get approval for the private placement. But as depicted in figure 
2.7.3, there are extremely few repair issues completed relative to the number of private 
placements. On average, approximately 13% of private placements were followed up with a 
subsequent repair issue from 2016 to 2019 (there is no available data on repair issues before 
2016). 
 
Figure 2.7.3 – Annual number of private placements and repair issues, 2016-2019 
 
On average, repair issues account for approximately 3.2% of the total gross proceeds. 
Considering the small size of repair issues compared to the size of the private placement, it 
raises a question of whether a subsequent repair issue serves its purpose in compensating 
non-participating shareholders in practice. 
Based on conversations with practitioners within Norne Securities (Tønnesen, 2021), it was 
confirmed that many of the repair issues are canceled after completion of the private 
placement. Issuing companies have, therefore, at least by documentation, an intention to 
undertake a repair issue. However, in practice, it is often seen that market prices fall to, or 
below, the subscription price offered in the repair issue, suggesting that non-participating 
shareholders are better off if their ownership is rectified through buying shares in the market. 
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of their shareholders were invited to participate in the private placement. Although, in many 
cases, this may solely relate to large shareholders of the issuing company (depending on how 
fragmented their shareholder base is) and not necessarily small shareholders. 
In some circumstances, it may be the case that even a full repair issue at the same price will 
not be likely and/or sufficient to avoid breaching the equal treatment rule. For this reason, the 
issuer is still required to assess other alternatives to raise capital.  
2.7.4 Shareholder approval 
In most countries, by law or regulation, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances 
undertaken by a certain approach or exceeding a specified threshold. As equity issuances can 
abruptly change the ownership structure of the issuing company, tight restrictions are usually 
set. In Norway, this is regulated by chapter 5 in the Norwegian Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act (Aksjeloven, 1997). Here, it is stated that the ordinary majority requirement 
for a resolution of the general meeting is by a majority vote (typically more than 50%), but, as 
we will see, the majority requirement for equity issuances diverges from the ordinary majority 
requirement. This varies across and within countries and can be classified according to a scale 
from 1 to 5, proposed by Holderness (2018): 
1) No shareholder vote to approve the issuance within the last five years. 
2) Shareholder vote occurs more than one year but less than five years before issuance. 
3) Shareholders approve an issuance within one year through a general mandate from 
the annual meeting. 
4) Shareholders must approve a specific issue by majority vote, and the issuance must 
occur within one year of the vote. 
5) Shareholders must approve a specific equity issuance by a supermajority, and the 
issuance must occur within one year of the vote. 
 
An overview of different countries and their classifications for each of the three approaches 
for equity issuance is presented in table 2.7.4. 
 










Table 2.7.4 (continued) 
Source: Holderness (2018) 
 
From table 2.7.4 we see that in Norway it is required to vote on specific issues or for a one-
year authorization, placing Norway in class 3. In Norway, a vote on equity issuance is regarded 
as a resolution held in a general meeting (PWC, n.d.). Thus, according to section 5-18 of the 
Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, Norwegian companies need a two-thirds 
majority (> 66%) to pass a vote on equity issuance (Aksjeloven, 1997). Most offerings on OSE 
are conducted as private placements through board authorizations granted for 2-year periods. 
The authorization provides corporate management with the possibility to waive shareholders 
pre-emptive rights and raise proceeds equivalent to an amount specified in the authorization, 
regardless of the consequences for non-participating shareholders (Aksjeloven, 1997). Thus, 
we would argue that Holderness should have assigned Norway to class 2.  
Interestingly, Norwegian law does not distinguish between voting requirements for a public 
offer, rights offer, or a private placement. This is an abnormality. In addition to Norway, 
Finland and Malaysia are the only countries listed in table 2.7.4 which do not distinguish 
20 
 
between the different approaches, but, on the other hand, they have a generally stricter 
classification (4). Generally, we see that rights offers have a lower shareholder vote 
requirement than both public offers and private placement, and not all countries undertake 
public offers and/or private placements at all. Private placements usually have the strictest 
requirement, except in the case of Singapore.  
If Norwegian companies were to take full advantage of the current requirements, this means 
it could bring in a new large shareholder with a decisive say on management decisions, each 
year. This will dramatically change the ownership structure of the company and possibly the 
direction of the company without any input of one-third of the existing shareholders. 
A lack of differentiation between requirements for shareholder approval for rights offers and, 
especially, private placements increase the likelihood of issuing equity through private 
placements. As we have debated in section 2.6, the process is cheaper, more efficient, and 
secures the necessary funds quickly. However, as mentioned, private placements have an 
inherent differential treatment, which is obviously of concern across a large majority of the 
countries in table 2.7.4. For example, in Sweden, a private placement must by law be approved 
by either 66% or 90% majority depending on whether outsiders (66%) or insiders (90%) are 
targeted in the issuance. Meanwhile, a rights offer requires a regular majority vote. This can 
in some part explain the dominance of rights issues in Sweden, and also shed light on why 
private placements dominate in the Norwegian equity market. 
Holderness (2018) further finds a connection between shareholder approval and 
announcement returns on SEOs. Equity issuances that are shareholder-approved are associated 
with positive and higher announcement returns relative to issues approved only by 
management or board of directors; +2% and -2%, respectively. This holds for public offers, 
rights issues, and private placements.  
The positive announcement returns increases with a higher required majority vote and the 
closer in time the vote is to the issuance. For instance, Holderness (2018) shows that in the US 
and Canada, shareholder approval is required for private placements if the issue is above 20% 
of the total shares outstanding, whilst approval is not necessary for public or rights offers. If 
shareholders have approved the issues, this is related to a positive abnormal return of 2%, 
compared to a negative abnormal return of -2% of managerial issues (no shareholder approval 
required). Furthermore, private placements to insiders in Sweden are related to 11.67% 
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positive abnormal announcement return, compared to -0.52% in the Netherlands where 
shareholder approval for private placements is not required. Positive announcement returns 
from private placements has also been found in Japan and the UK.  
While we are inclined to accept that there is a relation between shareholder approval and 
market reactions to SEOs, the conclusion is from our perspective too simple. For instance, the 
abnormal announcement returns for Norwegian private placements have been shown to be 
+2.66% (Eckbo, 2007), this research is conducted on data from 1980 to 1996 and is 






The literature in the previous section presents some interesting findings which form the basis 
for our motivation and development of our two hypotheses. We know from the literature 
review that announcement returns on private placements are generally proven to be positive 
across countries, including Norway. But we start our analysis by investigating if this also holds 
for our more recent sample period. Secondly, we research characteristics of the event that 
potentially have a significant impact on the announcement returns. Lastly, with this as a 
foundation, we further examine the relationship between announcement returns and the 
theoretical price fall when private placements are announced. As depicted below, our first 
hypothesis is formulated around this matter. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The actual returns observed are not equivalent to the expected theoretical price 
fall after the announcement of a private placement. 
H0: CAAR1 =   Theoretical price fall  
H1: CAAR   Theoretical price fall 
 
With Hypothesis 1 we aim to examine whether the market’s reaction to private placement 
announcements suggests that the issuance signals information beyond the theoretical price fall. 
There may be other information inherent in the market that tends to either overstate or 
understate the economic impact of the discount and inherent dilution in private placements. 









Hypothesis 2: The theoretical price fall with subsequent repair issues and without repair 
issues does not have an equivalent effect on CAR. 
 
H0:  Theoretical price fall with repair issues =  Theoretical price fall without repair issues 
H1:  Theoretical price fall with repair issues ≠  Theoretical price fall without repair issues 
 
Hypothesis 2 was motivated by Oslo Børs’ requirement for issuing companies to compensate 
existing shareholders for any disadvantages caused by the private placement through a 
subsequent repair issue. We know from figure 2.7.3 that there are held very few and relatively 
small repair issues despite being an important aspect in the assessment for approval of the 
equity issuance. It would therefore be interesting to investigate if the market sentiment 
coincides with Oslo Børs’ focus on repair issues. Hence, we believe the announcement of a 
subsequent repair issue holds information regarding shareholders’ perception of the 




In this section, we present the methodologies used to test our hypotheses from the previous 
section. First, we will present the methodology of an event study and its nature and how we 
calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs). Second, we describe the 
methodology of our cross-sectional study. Lastly, we address how we approach significance 
testing to test our hypotheses. 
4.1 Event Study  
The event study methodology is one of the most frequently used empirical techniques in a 
variety of fields, such as finance, accounting, and law, to measure the effects of a given event 
that is hypothesized to affect the market value of firms (MacKinlay, 1997). To be able to 
examine any effects on firm values, the event itself should have a significant chance to impact 
either the firms’ expected future cash flows or discount rate. Fundamental to the methodology 
is the efficient market hypothesis, stating that, given rationality in the market, information 
from an event will be reflected immediately in security prices (Fama et al., 1969). With a 
substantial amount of financial market data, an event study is highly suitable to reflect the 
market reaction to new information such as announcements.  
Despite the fact that event studies do not have a unique structure, there is a general flow of 
analysis (MacKinlay, 1997). The initial step of an event study is to define the event of interest, 
which in our case is the public announcement of the specific private placement.  
4.2 Event Window 
We need to identify the event window i.e., specify the period in which the event will be 
examined. It should be long enough for the market to absorb the information from the event, 
but short enough to exclude confounding effects (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). MacKinlay 
(1997) argues that the event window commonly should include at least one day prior to and 
one day after the event date. This captures both potentially leaked information to the market 
before the event day and the price effects of announcements that occur after the stock market 
closes on the announcement day. The latter is especially important in our study because, as 
mentioned in previous sections, private placements are generally announced after market 
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close. It has been empirically demonstrated that a short event window will usually capture the 
effect of an event (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In addition, Brown and Warner (1985) argue 
that a long event window reduces the test statistics’ power.  Thus, to test our hypotheses, we 
examine the event over the event date itself and one day prior and one day after the event date, 
[-1, 1]. 
4.2.1 Estimation Window 
Specifying the length of an estimation window is a more debated topic. Estimation windows 
are used to estimate the expected or normal return for each company without conditioning on 
the event in the event window (Henderson, 1990). There is a trade-off between including more 
days in the estimation period to increase the statistical accuracy, and the risk of shifting return-
generating parameters (Strong, 1992). Furthermore, to prevent biased results, the estimation 
window must not overlap with the event window, as the normal return should not be influenced 
by the event itself (MacKinlay, 1997). When estimating the normal return in this study, we 
utilize an estimation period of 250 days (approximately one trading year); [-260, -10]. Equity 
issuances are often issued each year, thus, a longer estimation period would increase the risk 
of overlapping events, complicating our effort to isolate and measure the effect of each event. 
The timeline of our event study is illustrated in figure 4.2.1 where the event date is defined as 
t = 0. 
 






A hold-out window starting ten days prior to the event and ending one day prior to the event 
is included to exclude any confounding events and information leakage outside the event 
window. 
t (days) 
[Event Window] [Estimation Window] 















4.2.2 Abnormal Return 
Assessing the event’s impact on the security’s return requires a measure of abnormal return. 
The abnormal return is the actual return of the security over the event window minus the 
normal return of the firm over the event window (MacKinlay, 1997). For firm i and event date 
t the equation for abnormal return is as followed: 
   
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑅𝑖𝑡  −  𝐸 (𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡)   (4.1) 
 
Where ARit is the abnormal return, Rit is the actual return and E(Rit|Xt) is the normal return 
conditioning on information from the event, Xt. 
We apply the OSEBX for the market return. The OSEBX consists of a representative selection 
of all listed securities on the OSE. 
To estimate the normal return for a firm, we use the market model using the Single Index 
Model (SIM). The market model assumes a linear relationship between the return of a given 
security and the market portfolio (MacKinlay, 1997). According to MacKinlay (1997), this is 
the preferred model as the model removes the part of the return that is associated with the 
market portfolio’s return, increasing the ability to isolate the effect of the event. The use of the 
market model is also supported by Brown and Warner (1985). The equation for the market 
model is expressed in equation 4.2: 
   
𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (4.2) 
𝐸 ( 𝑖𝑡 = 0)    𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡)  =  𝜎 𝑖
2  
 
Where Rit is the return of the given security i at time t, Rmt is the market portfolio’s return at 
time t, and it is the error term at time t with an expected value of zero and variance of 2i. 
The market model uses ordinary least square regressions (OLS) to estimate the model’s 
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parameters: 𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂?. The parameters are estimated for each event separately, as company 
characteristics may have changed during our sample period. In order to ensure robustness, we 
also examined our results by using the constant mean return model, which assumes that the 
mean return of a given security is constant through time (MacKinlay, 1997). 
With the parameter estimates from the market model, the abnormal returns can be calculated 
by equation 4.3. 
 
   𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡  −  (𝛼?̂?  +  𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡)  (4.3) 
 
When aggregating the abnormal returns from each observation we get the average abnormal 
return (AAR). AARt is expressed in equation 4.4 for day t with N events. 









Finally, we can calculate the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in the event 
window for all firms in the sample. The equation for CAAR is shown in equation 4.5, where 
N is the number of firms in the sample. 












4.3 Cross-sectional Study 
When there appear to be multiple characteristics of the event that are associated with the 
abnormal returns, it can be useful to conduct a subsequent cross-sectional study (MacKinlay, 
1997). We use cross-sectional regressions by deploying cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as 
a dependent variable and variables of interest as independent or explanatory variables. Such 
an analysis can extract additional information from the sample by providing insight on which 
characteristics of the event are the strongest determinators of the abnormal returns. The cross-
sectional regression is expressed in equation 4.6. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  𝛿0  +  𝛿1𝑋1𝑖  + . . . + 𝛿𝑀𝑋𝑀𝑖  +  𝜂𝑖   (4.6) 
 
𝐸(𝜂𝑖)  =  0  𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝜂𝑖)  =  𝜎𝜂𝑖
2  
 
Where CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return and Xs are the characteristics. The error 
term i is assumed to have a mean return of zero and is uncorrelated with the Xs. The 
parameters of the regression model are estimated using the OLS method. Further, we use the 
Breusch-Pagan test to investigate the presence of heteroscedasticity (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; 
Wooldridge, 2012), as the OLS method assumes homoscedastic error terms, i.e., constant 
variance. This is advised by MacKinlay (1997) because the assumption of homoscedastic error 
terms is often violated. We have therefore applied heteroscedastic robust standard errors in 
cases where the assumption of homoscedasticity fails using the approach of White (1980). We 
also check for multicollinearity by computing correlation matrixes and performing VIF-tests, 
this is discussed in further detail in section 7.3. 
Issues in interpreting the cross-sectional results can arise. It may be the case that investors 
anticipate an equity issuance conducted with a certain approach, especially for firms that 
announce scheduled future equity issuances or frequently issues equity in line with their 
growth strategy. To the extent of investors’ anticipation of a private placement, abnormal 
returns can be reduced in the event window, as investors will react even before the 
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announcement is made. This introduces a selection bias. The assumption that the error term is 
uncorrelated with the Xs fails and the OLS estimators are inconsistent (MacKinlay, 1997). 
However, Prabhala (1997) argues that, despite an incorrect specification, the OLS method can 
be used for inference and that the t-statistic can be interpreted as a conservative estimate of 
the significance level. 
4.4 Significance Testing 
To test our two hypotheses, we need to examine whether CAR is significantly different from 
zero and, thus, not a result of pure chance.  
Commonly, the literature separates between parametric and nonparametric tests to examine 
the statistical significance of abnormal returns. Parametric tests assume that the abnormal 
returns are normally distributed, whereas nonparametric tests do not hold such an assumption 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Whether one test is preferable over the other is debated among 
researchers. Brown and Warner (1985) argue that there is evidence that mean excess returns 
in a cross-section of securities converge to normality with an increasing number of 
observations (central limit theorem). And, that parametric tests for significance of mean 
abnormal returns, therefore, could be well-specified. However, parametric and nonparametric 
tests are typically combined in order to reduce any suspicion of results being driven by outliers. 
Hence, in our analysis, we use both parametric and nonparametric tests to ensure robustness. 
In our analysis, we test whether CAR significantly differs from zero by primarily applying the 
conventional t-test (parametric) and the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (nonparametric). 
A common assumption in the event study methodology is the assumption of constant variance 
(Brown & Warner, 1985). When this assumption is not valid, results are less reliable as 
statistical tests may overstate or understate the abnormal returns. Hence, if the securities’ 
returns are very volatile before the announcement, the event might not be significantly 
different from earlier levels. In our case, this might not be as vital because private placements 
are by nature more secretive and, thus minimizes the likelihood for information leakage, and, 
lastly, by viewing announcement reactions in our sample, we can verify low volatility. 
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5. Data  
In the following section, the aim is to clarify the selection and gathering process of the obtained 
data used to perform the analysis. Furthermore, we discuss the rationale for choosing specific 
variables and samples to conduct our research. The selection process contained several manual 
steps and subjective judgments. Thus, we underline the importance of understanding how we 
carefully selected and merged our dataset. Additionally, the section will describe the sample 
used to conduct the research.  
We retrieved the statistics on equity issues from Oslo Børs’ homepage. Details regarding the 
settlement (cash or stock) and how management intended to use the proceeds were found by 
reading the stock exchange announcement (NewsWeb, 2021). We extracted stock and OSEBX 
Index returns from the Amadeus database at NHH. Furthermore, stock returns and OSEBX 
Index returns were paired with the individual company’s event date. A table depicting all 
private placements in our sample can be found in Appendices A.  
5.1 Determining the sample 
Available statistics on equity issues on Oslo Børs’ homepage specifies the date, company, 
number of shares issued, share price, and total proceeds. The total number of equity issues 
across all floatation methods (including IPOs and issues to employees) was 1,471 between 
January 2011 and November 2020. Out of the 1,471 issues, there were 730 private placements. 
These are eligible for further research. 
To eliminate the risk of misregistration, events of negligible size, and sample bias due to 
induced volatility, the following criteria for selection was introduced (reduction in the sample 
in parentheses):  
1. Remove private placements that raised gross proceeds lower than NOK 10 million 
(225). 
2. The private placement must be settled in cash and return data must be available (252). 
3. Remove any private placement after 30.01.2020 to avoid increased volatility (due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic) in the estimates surrounding the events (51).  
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Furthermore, some shortcomings in the dataset had to be addressed before further research 
was conducted. Firstly, the date column in the Oslo Børs statistic reflected the date the equity 
issuance was filed in the Brønnøysund register. Since our research measures announcement 
returns, the date of filing is irrelevant. Instead, we extracted the announcement date from the 
issuing firms’ stock exchange notices. Additionally, the dataset does not describe any further 
details concerning the issues, such as if the issue is settled in cash (or stock) or what the firms 
intend to use the proceeds for. Consequently, we read the stock exchange notices describing 
each private placement to clarify if the private placement entailed the necessary characteristics 
to be a part of our research.  
To further isolate the effect of announcing a private placement, we initiated additional criteria 
for selection:  
4. The private placement is excluded if another significant announcement is reported on 
the same day – such as a merger or acquisition (77).  
5. The private placement is excluded if the company is in financial distress at the time of 
the announcement (30).  
Our research concerns private placements where capital is raised through stock issues. Thus, 
any private placement without a cash settlement is irrelevant. Furthermore, to mitigate the risk 
of noise in our sample we have taken out private placements where a separate major stock 
exchange announcement is made on the same day. Oftentimes the announcement of a merger 
or acquisition. Finally, we have not included issues where the company (at the time of the 
offering) is in financial distress in such that the equity issue is necessary to restructure and 
potentially avoid bankruptcy. In such instances, we believe that the announcement effect 
would be disturbed by the alternative, the likelihood of bankruptcy. After this process, we are 
left with 95 private placements across 73 different firms. The final step entailed collecting 
stock and OSEBX index prices, computing log-returns, and merging the data.  
Due to our strict selection criteria, we recognize that our sample of 95 private placements 
mainly represents equity issues with one of the two specific purposes: business opportunity 
(excluding M&A) and no special purpose other than favorable market conditions. Thus, after 
criteria 1-3 are applied, our sample consists of approximately 50% of the remaining events 
(95/202). Hence, the remaining 95 events may or may not present different characteristics 
than the sample otherwise would if all 202 events were included. But our aim was to isolate 
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the effect of the private placement as an approach for equity issuance as extensively as 
possible, and, thus, judged the strict criteria necessary for our study. 
5.2 Sample description 
As mentioned in the previous section, the final sample consists of 95 different private 
placements across 73 different companies where no company is represented more than 3 times. 
The sample covers a variety of industries, and all existing sectors at OSE are represented.  
 
Figure 5.2  – Number of firms per sector in the sample (N = 95), 2012 - 2020 
 
 
Figure 5.2 depicts the sector composition amongst the firms in our sample (e24, 2021). As 
expected, the industry and energy sector are highly represented as those sectors have 
dominated OSE in the last decades. Furthermore, the financial industry and IT & Telecom are 
represented with 11 and 8 firms, respectively. The sample is diverse and its overweight in 
energy and industry represents a fair picture of the firm composition on OSE. 
Figure 5.2.1 shows how the private placements in our sample are distributed across time. 
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placements on OSE. The average discount and relative number of shares issued are between 
4-10% and 13-21%, respectively. A slight increase is observed in the average discount in 
later years, which might indicate that the firms issuing equity have become increasingly 
opportunistic over time, hence selling the shares cheaply relative to the observed share price.  
 
Figure 5.2.1  – Distribution of events in the sample2 
 
An overview of the statistical properties featured in the sample is presented in table 5.2. The 
mean and median proceeds raised are NOK 387.5 and 200 million, respectively. The skewed 
mean hints at outliers among the sample observations, which is further confirmed by the range 
between the minimum and maximum for gross proceeds raised. The observed standard 
deviation is higher for the shares issued (12.5%) than the subscription discount (9.9%). 
Indicating that the firms perceive the discount as less flexible than the relative number of 
shares issued in the offering.   
 
 
2 In our sample there is only one private placement that is announced in 2020. Thus, for illustration purposes in 
















































































Number of PPs Proceeds raised (NOK bn)
Mean subscription discount Mean relative shares issued
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Table  5.2  – Descriptive statistcs for 95 private placements 
 
 
Firm size (measured in market capitalization) ranges from NOK 96 million to NOK 27 billion. 
It is notable that the market capitalization of the largest firm in our sample is NOK 27 billion. 
This is significantly lower than the market capitalization of the largest firms on OSE. Implying 
that the largest firms do not issue equity through private placements. We propose two possible 
explanations for this: 1) The largest firms might have significant cash reserves and prefer to 
fund investments through retained earnings (or debt), aligning with the pecking-order theory. 
2) Firms with high governmental ownership might be discouraged to waive the preemptive 
rights of their shareholders. 
The first proposition is supported by observations in our raw dataset showing that there are 
few SEOs amongst the largest firms between 2012 and 2020. Except for Norsk Hydro, none 
of the large firms with significant state ownership (Equinor, DNB, Norsk Hydro, Yara) have 
undertaken SEOs during the sample period. Since SEOs are scarce amongst these firms, there 
is little data to support proposition two. However, we cannot reject the notion that firms with 







5.3 Variables applied 
To increase the understanding of the nature of private placements in Norway, select variables 
are used to divide the sample and analyze relations between announcement returns and the 
specific variables. In the following section, we discuss the motives and economic rationale 
behind the selected variables.  
5.3.1 Subscription price discount 
As described in section 2.6, the offering price in a private placement is often set at a discount 
to attract investors to participate in the offering. The subscription price depicts the implied 
value per share at which the firm can raise capital. Thus, any discount between the prevailing 
market price and the subscription price should, ceteris paribus, reduce the firm value of the 
issuing company. This variable is introduced to understand if the presumed relation between 
the discount and negative announcement effects is observed in our sample. The variable is 
computed as follows:  





5.3.2 Relative shares issued 
The second variable is the number of new shares issued, delineated as relative shares issued. 
We introduce this variable to understand if increased dilution influences announcement 
returns. Isolated, non-participating shareholders are diluted since the number of new shares 
issued increases, but the effect is offset by the cash proceeds as depicted in section 2.1. The 
variable is computed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 =
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒






5.3.3 Theoretical price fall 
As previously discussed, any price depreciation on the issuers’ share price (post-
announcement) should be dependent on the combination of the subscription discount and the 
relative number of shares issued. Thus, we introduce this variable to investigate if there are 
any abnormalities in the relationship between the CARs and the anticipated theoretical price 
fall. All else equal, we would expect that there is a one-to-one relationship between the CARs 
and the theoretical price fall. Where the theoretical price fall is defined as:  
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 × 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 
A practical example of the theoretical price fall variable is presented in Appendices E.  
5.3.4 Repair issue announcement 
Whether or not the firm holds a repair issue is introduced to understand if compensating non-
participating shareholders influences announcement returns. Holding a repair issue can be 
perceived as decent corporate governance as it compensates the non-participating shareholders 
for removing their preemptive rights. Although the offering price in the repair issue matches 
the subscription price set in the private placement, the intrinsic compensation from a repair 
issue is more complicated to determine. In isolated terms, it depends on the relative number 
of shares issued compared to the shares offered in the private placement. However, if the share 
price falls following the private placement, the subscription rights in the repair issue become 
less valuable. 
 By introducing a repair issue dummy variable, where it takes the value of one if a subsequent 












There are several interesting differences between the two samples. First, the firms that do not 
hold a subsequent repair issue have a mean market capitalization of around NOK 4 billion, 
compared to NOK 2.2 billion for the firms that announce repair issues. The discrepancy in 
firm size between the samples can have an impact on the proceeds raised, as larger firms tend 
to raise more capital than smaller firms. This is supported by the observation of average 
proceeds raised of NOK 280 million and 476 million for the firms that announced a repair 
issue and those who do not, respectively. In section 7.3 we can also see that market 
capitalization and proceeds raised have an 84.2% correlation.  
Additionally, we observe that the mean discounts and relative shares issued are higher for the 
sample with the announcement of a subsequent repair issue. Indicating that firms are more 
likely to hold a repair issue when the offering is increasingly unfavorable to non-participating 
shareholders because of a significant discount and dilution. In conclusion, we find that larger 
firms tend to hold less discriminatory offerings, and thus, disregard the repair issue. Whilst 
smaller firms undertake private placements with higher discounts and dilution, and thus, 
carries out the repair issue to compensate for the inherent discrimination imposed on non-
participating shareholders.  
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5.3.5 Interaction variable (Repair issue x Theoretical price fall)  
As explained in Hypothesis 2, we attempt to research whether the announcement of a 
subsequent repair issue influences CAR through the theoretical price fall variable. Thus, we 
introduce an interaction variable where the repair issue announcement variable is multiplied 
with the theoretical price fall variable.  
The coefficient for the interaction variable represents any additional effect an announcement 
of a repair issue has on CAR if the theoretical price fall change, compared to a private 
placement which does not announce a subsequent repair issue. 
5.3.6 Proceeds raised 
The proceeds raised variable depicts the amount of capital raised in the offering before any 
costs are incurred. We compute the natural logarithm of the proceeds raised variable to 
improve the model’s fit between the dependent variable (CAR) and proceeds raised.  
The variable is introduced to investigate if there is any relation between the size of the offering 
and the announcement returns. For instance, investors might react more positively to a larger 
offering if this is perceived to increase the likelihood of undertaking new and large business 
opportunities. However, we anticipate that most investors have confidence in corporate 
managements’ ability to decide an appropriate offering. 
5.3.7 Market capitalization  
Similar to the proceeds raised variable, market capitalization is also computed as the natural 
logarithmic value to provide a better fit to the regression model. We assume that firms with 
high market capitalization are likely to be sounder financially compared to smaller firms. Thus, 
investors might perceive business opportunities undertaken by larger firms as more likely to 
be successful. If this assumption holds, then the announcement returns should be positively 
associated with firm size. Thus, firm size measured as market capitalization is included as an 






In the following section, we present and discuss the results from the event study and the cross-
sectional regressions. First, preliminary findings are introduced. Secondly, we discuss the 
results from the short-run event study for both the full sample and the subsamples. This will 
serve as a good background before we finally discuss our two hypotheses described in section 
3. The analysis was conducted with the objective to test the hypotheses. 
6.1 Initial observations 
After completing the sample selection process, we computed the returns over a window 
corresponding to [-260, 260] as depicted in Figure 6.1.  
 




























Trading days prior to and after a private placement (event)
stocks accumulated avg.return obx accumulated avg.return
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The motivation for illustrating the initial observations was to uncover any unexpected patterns 
in our data. Figure 6.1 gives a bird’s-eye view of the development of the stocks’ returns. First, 
it shows that the stock returns are on the average negative on the announcement date (t = 0). 
Secondly, we see that the returns are for the most part stronger prior to the announcement, 
with a markedly negative trend after the announcement of a private placement. Although long-
term events are beside the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to see that the returns support 
the findings of Hertzel et al., (1993) of long-term underperformance after a private placement.  
6.2 Short-run event study  
In this subsection, we discuss the results of the event study. First, we will use our entire sample 
of 95 private placements to examine whether the announcement of private placements has a 
significant impact on stock returns within the event window. Then, we divide the sample based 
on whether the private placement was followed up by an announcement of a repair issue and 
examine the short-run results. 
6.2.1 Short-run event study full sample 
Table 6.2.1 depicts the abnormal announcement returns for the firms in our full sample that 
conducts private placements on OSE in the period between January 2012 and January 2020. 
The results show that the firms report between -4.04% and -5.9% CAAR post announcement. 
We find that the abnormal announcement reaction is consistent across different event 
windows, and for two different estimation models: The Single Index Model and Constant 
Mean Model. Additionally, the announcement returns are statistically significant at a 1% level, 
consistent across all event windows and for both estimation models. We also notice that the 
CAARs are both lower and more significant in the constant mean return model. Lastly, the 
CAARs hold when using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test at a 1% level (see Appendices H). 




Thus, the results support the theory of negative announcement returns following a SEO 
suggested by Eckbo (2007). However, our findings contradict several of the contemporary 
studies that find positive abnormal returns after the announcement of a private placement 
(Holderness, 2018). Making it less intuitive as to why private placements are the dominant 
approach on OSE. We, therefore, propose that our findings should be compared with studies 
researching the dominant approach in respective markets, commonly rights or public 
offerings. The laws and regulations in the respective markets must also be considered since 
issue methods that require a considerable level of shareholder protection tend to exhibit 
higher returns (Holderness, 2018). As discussed in section 2.7.4, undertaking private 
placements in Norway does not require a larger majority of shareholder approval than other 
approaches for equity issuances, providing shareholders with no additional protection for the 
differential treatment. 
Additionally, the finding of negative announcement returns does not support the certification 
and monitoring hypothesis introduced in section 2.6.1. In contrast, we rather find evidence 
supporting the opposing proposition of asymmetric information. Stating that an equity issue 
signals firm value (Ross, 1977), and managers tend to issue equity when the firm’s equity is 
overvalued, thus, the market penalizes the equity issuance (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In 
addition, it confirms that non-participating shareholders experience negative returns aligning 
with the research of Krishnamurthy et al., (2004). This is also in line with figure 6.1. 
Furthermore, the results do support our economic intuition that on average, announcement 
returns after a private placement should be negative due to the subscription discount and 
dilution. As portrayed in figure 6.2.1, the negative returns are highly concentrated on the 
announcement day (t = 0), which is the only day that achieves statistically significant results 








Figure  6.2.1  – Daily AAR across [-9, 9] days  
 
 
6.2.2 Short-run event study subsamples 
As depicted in figure 6.2.2 (1), the repair issue group obtains CAARs of -6.16% on the event 
day (t = 0) using the Single Index Model, compared to -2.34% for the no repair issue group. 
We can therefore see that the subsample undertaking subsequent repair issues reports a lower 
announcement return than the subsample without subsequent repair issues. We obtain 
statistical significance on the event day at a 1% level (see figure 6.2.2 (2)), but only for the 
subsample with repair issues and the full sample. 
 











































































CAAR All PPs (N = 95) CAAR No repair issues (N = 52) CAAR With repair issues (N = 43)
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Figure 6.2.2 (2) – T-values for the different samples in a [-5, 5] window 
 
 
At first, and in accordance with the requirements from Oslo Børs, we would expect that the 
market would react more positively towards issuing companies offering a repair issue to 
rectify their ownership. On the other hand, issuing additional shares in a repair issue at a 
discount will rationally reduce the effective pricing of the firm, as it strengthens the 
theoretical price fall. In addition, as depicted in the descriptive statistics in table 5.3.4, the 
repair issue sample has a larger mean discount and relative shares issued. Thus, solely 
regarding the economic value of the shares, the value is notably reduced when a private 
placement’s characteristics require a subsequent repair issue.  
Considering that we present the results of the market reaction, we can only consider the 
economic value in terms of the share price. Thus, we do not have grounds to conclude 
whether the repair issues are able to rectify the dilution on non-participating shareholders 
caused by private placements. However, there is reason to believe that this is not the case 
since non-participating shareholders often hold a substantial percentage of total shares 
outstanding, and the repair issues tend to be small compared to its relative size to the private 
placements (as depicted in section 2.7.3).  
We propose two additional explanations for the observed CAAR inconsistencies between the 
repair issue and no repair issue group: 1) The repair issue offers firms an opportunity to hold 
private placements with higher discounts and/or dilution whilst complying with OSE 






























All PPs No repair issues Repair issues Sign.level (1.96)
44 
 
without a high discount and/or dilution, and as a consequence the issuer holds a repair issue 
to compensate.  
6.3 Cross-sectional regression full sample 
To further understand the origin of the observed effects in the event study, we conduct cross-
sectional regressions with CAR as a dependent variable and several variables of interest as 
independent variables (all outlined in section 5), within the event window [-1,1].   
6.3.1 Announcement returns and the theoretical price fall 
Aligning with our first hypothesis, we study the relationship between CAR and the theoretical 
price fall in more detail. The results of the regressions are presented in table 6.3.1. 
 





For the individual regressions, we find that the subscription discount (lm1) and the theoretical 
price fall (lm3) have a significant impact on CARs, both on a 1% level. The coefficients for 
lm1 and lm3 indicate that if these variables increase by 1%, then CARs will decrease by 
0.889% and 2.015%, respectively. Further, we do not find a statistically significant relation 
between CARs and the relative shares issued (lm2), repair issue dummy (lm4), (ln) proceeds 
raised (lm5), or (ln) market capitalization (lm6) variables when regressed individually. In the 
multiple regression (lm8) the coefficient of the theoretical price fall variable has an even larger 
impact on CAR and a higher statistical significance. The subscription discount, relative shares 
issued, and proceeds raised variables are not included in the multiple regression because of 
multicollinearity which is further elaborated on in section 7.3.  
Interestingly, in lm 8, we also observe that a 1% increase in the market capitalization 
variable is now associated with a 0.02% decrease in CARs with statistical significance on a 
5% level. This implies that larger firms are more prone to negative announcement returns. 
Large firms might have more options to finance investments compared to smaller firms. 
Either with retained earnings or by taking on debt as they have a higher debt capacity. 
Higher debt is positive for shareholders since their return increase as long as the benefit from 
an increase in tax shield outweighs potential bankruptcy costs. Thus, aligning with the 
pecking-order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), the market could react more negatively when 
large firms issue equity since they realistically have other options compared to smaller firms.  
From table 6.3, we can conclude that the predominant variable causing the negative CAR is 
the theoretical price fall, with a significant coefficient of -2.329. However, it must be 
pointed out that the subscription discount is the primary driver of the theoretical price fall. 
This is evident by their 0.861 correlation (see section 7.3) and the discount’s dominance in 
explaining CAR in lm 7. Isolated, the number of shares issued does not decrease the value of 
a firm, only when shares are issued at a discount will the firm value be affected negatively. 
Thus, the discount decides the direction of CAR, but the number of shares issued determines 
how far the CAR goes in that particular direction. Thus, combined they are more able to 
explain the negative CAR. 
The apparent relation between the theoretical price fall and CAR is not surprising since any 
rational investor would value a company lower as the discount increases, particularly if 
dilution increases as well. And, as previously mentioned, increased discount typically goes 
hand-in-hand with increased dilution as more shares must be sold to raise the targeted 
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amount of proceeds. All else equal, the relationship between the theoretical price fall and 
announcement returns should be one-to-one as our null hypothesis suggest. However, we 
find that the issuer CAR declines by 2.329% for every 1% of theoretical price fall. 
Hypothesis 1 is therefore valid, and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Our results depict a market where the shareholders are punishing the issuer more vigorously 
than expected. As described in section 2.7.4, most private placements on OSE are carried out 
through board authorizations, where the granted authorization is valid for two years. Thus, 
the details regarding the offering, such as the discount, number of shares issued, and the 
intended use of the proceeds are oftentimes not shareholder approved. Thus, the relationship 
between shareholder approval and announcement returns depicted in section 2.7.4 might in 
part explain why announcement returns are lower than the theoretical price fall would 
suggest.  
Presuming that these results are representative of the population, i.e., all firms that undertake 
private placements on OSE, then the following should be considered: First, the indirect 
floatation cost might be higher than corporate management expect. After our conversations 
with Norne Securities, we suspect that the indirect flotation costs are of secondary concern 
compared to direct costs such as the prospectus. As depicted in section 2.3, the indirect costs 
are challenging to quantify, however, according to our findings they can be substantial. 
Finally, the results are perceived to support the pecking-order theory since it shows that the 
cost of offering equity has unfavorable consequences on the issuer’s share price. Thus, firms 
might prefer other means of financing such as retained earnings or debt.  
For the regulatory embodiment of OSE, it might be interesting to note that the stand-alone 
variable with the most persistent impact on CAR is the discount. Thus, we propose that 
regulators should be more worried about high discounts in private placements rather than 
dilution. However, as we multiply these variables to the theoretical price fall variable, it is 




6.3.2 CAR and repair issue announcements    
By introducing a final regression in table 6.3.1 (lm9), we test if a change in the theoretical 
price fall has an equal effect on CAR based on whether a subsequent repair issue is 
announced (Hypothesis 2). 
In lm 9, the variable of interest is the interaction variable “Repair issue x Theoretical price 
fall”, which was explained in section 5.3.5. We find that the coefficient for the interaction 
variable has a value of 2.68, which is significant at the 1% level. This implies that a 1% 
increase in the theoretical price fall increases CAR by 2.68% if a subsequent repair issue is 
announced. Thus, the coefficient for theoretical price fall on private placements with repair 
issues is -1.91 (-4.59 + 2.68) (see table in Appendices G). That is, when a repair issue is 
announced, CAR drops, but less since all shares will now have a right to buy new shares at a 
discount when the repair issue is held on a later date. Hypothesis 2 is therefore valid, and the 
null hypothesis is rejected. 
The validation of Hypothesis 2 is in line with Oslo Børs’ view of repair issues, where a 
repair issue serves to rectify non-participating shareholders’ ownership stake. However, as 
mentioned in section 2.7.3, we often see that market prices fall to, or below, the discounted 
price offered in the repair issue. This suggests that it is more favorable for non-participating 
shareholders to trade in the open market to rectify their ownership than to participate in the 
subsequent repair issue. This also provides an advantage for the issuing firm since there is no 
longer a need to issue additional shares, and thus cause more dilution to its shareholders or 
incur any other costs related to the repair issue. With this reasoning, the value in the right to 
buy shares at a discount drops to zero. Either way, the announcement of a repair issue is 
beneficial for both the issuing company and existing and new shareholders since the CAR is 
higher even though the repair issues are usually relatively small compared to the total 
proceeds raised, as mentioned in section 2.7.3. The benefit comes on top of the advantage 
participants in the private placement already had. 
We further propose that the management, who hold superior information about its company 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984), choose to undertake a repair issue only in the case of high-value 
projects. This implies that managers want to protect smaller shareholders from missing out 
on valuable opportunities. Thus, for less valuable projects management do not protect 
smaller shareholders and allows large existing shareholders to fund the investment. Since 
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less valuable projects only provide a small increase in value for each shareholder (if 
everyone participates) management might feel justified to waive small shareholders’ 
preemptive rights. 
If managers only announce repair issues for high-value projects, it signals to the market that 
private placements without repair issues are less valuable. Thus, the announcement return 
would have a more negative reaction to a private placement that is not followed up with a 
repair issue. This could explain why the announcement returns react more negatively to a 
change in the theoretical price fall if the issuer does not announce a repair issue. On the 
other hand, large shareholders typically have a better understanding of the company than 
smaller shareholders. This is confirmed by the monitoring and certification hypothesis 
suggested by Wruck and Hertzel (1993; 1989) and the prospectus requirement by Oslo Børs. 
Thus, high participation from large shareholders or professional investors could legitimize 
the value of the project to the market.  
Regardless, we believe that the aforementioned interpretations imply that there is an agency 
issue, where the management prioritizes large, or even new shareholders before small 
shareholders. All shareholders have the right to receive equal treatment, and the value of the 
project should therefore not matter. 
The results discussed above may seem strange as results from the event study in section 
6.2.2 depicts the opposite – private placements with repair issues have a lower CAAR 
compared to issues without a repair issue. Intuitively you will expect the two results to 
coincide. This emphasizes the importance of conducting cross-sectional regressions, where it 
is possible to isolate the effect of different variables of interest and control for omitted 
variable bias. Cross-sections enable us to better explain the importance of each characteristic 





6.3.3 Determinants for holding a subsequent repair issue 
We run a regression model with the announcement of a repair issue as a dependent dummy 
variable while we use the same independent variables. This allows us to examine which 
variable determines the decision of holding a repair issue following a private placement. 
 
 
Table  6.4.1  – Cross-sectional regressions with repair issue as binary dependent 
 
 
From the cross-sectional regression, we notice a relationship between whether firms 
undertake a repair issue and the independent variables subscription discount, relative shares 
issued, and theoretical price fall. Here, a 1% increase in the subscription discount, relative 
shares issued, and theoretical price fall are associated with approximately 1.5%, 1.2%, and 
4.0% increase in the likelihood of an announcement of a repair issue, respectively. All 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, there is a combination of multiple variables 
which drive the decision whether to hold a repair issue, but we see that the theoretical price 
fall has the largest coefficient, and, thus, is the main driver. 
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More surprisingly, we report a statistically significant relation at the 1% level between the 
announcement of a repair issue and firm size. Thus, a 1% increase in firm size measured 
through the market capitalization variable is related to a 0.095% decrease in the likelihood 
of a repair issue. This aligns with the conclusion based on the descriptive statistics in section 
5, that smaller firms are more likely to hold discriminatory private placements, and thus 
announces a subsequent repair issue to compensate existing shareholders and/or align with 
OSE regulations.  
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7. Assessment of robustness 
In this section, we assess if our sample and results are consistent across various robustness 
tests. Debating the treatment of any outliers and the applied methods to secure that OLS-
assumptions are met. The OLS-assumptions are specified in appendices B.  
7.1 Treatment of outliers 
In appendices, C plots of our variables of interest are depicted. As observed, there are some 
outliers in the dependent variable (CAR) and the theoretical price fall variable. However, 
removing outliers without sound reasoning can lead to an overstatement of the causal effects 
through omitted variable bias. We have used several criteria (as depicted in section 5) when 
determining the sample, thus we are reluctant to remove outliers as they are perceived to be 
part of a random sample and contains valuable information.  
Thus, instead of removing the outliers, we report the cross-sectional regressions where outliers 
have been replaced using the winsorized mean method as suggested by Tukey (1962). The 
regressions using winsorized means are presented in appendices D. We note that our previous 
discussions in section 6 hold true after replacing the outliers with winsorized values. As such, 
we perceive this method as a contribution to ensuring the robustness in our regression models.  
7.2 Heteroskedasticity  
OLS-assumption nr.5 states that the error term in the regression must have a constant variance, 
i.e., that there is no presence of heteroscedasticity in our variables of choice. Thus, we test for 
heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test. For any variables with p-values < 5% we 
compute heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Further details regarding the tests and 
computation are deferred to appendices F. 
7.3 Multicollinearity 
The presence of multicollinearity can be described as linear correlations between the 
independent variables. Such presence refers to OLS-assumption 3, and it is thus a prerequisite 
that there is no multicollinearity or perfect collinearity between our independent variables 
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(Wooldridge, 2012). OLS 3 does allow for correlation, but not a perfect correlation. In the 
case of perfect collinearity or high correlation between the independent variables, coefficients 
run a higher risk of inaccurate estimates. To elucidate any presence of correlation amongst the 
variables we computed a correlation matrix which is presented in table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 – Correlation matrix for the independent variables of interest 
 
 
The table depicts a high correlation between the market capitalization variable and the 
proceeds raised variable. Additionally, there is a correlation between the subscription 
discount, relative shares issued, and theoretical price fall variables. This is anticipated since 
the theoretical price fall variable is derived from the subscription discount and relative shares 
issued.  
To further investigate if the presence of multicollinearity is evident, we perform VIF-tests  
(Alauddin, 2010). As a conservative threshold, we remove variables with a VIF-score > 5. As 
depicted in Table 7.3 (1) we get VIF-scores above > 5 for several of the independent variables. 
Thus, for the second VIF test, we remove the subscription discount, relative shares issued and 
the proceeds raised variables. We retain the theoretical price fall variable since it is of 
particular interest. After removing the aforementioned variables there are no VIF-scores > 1.5. 
Thus, we conclude that there is no multicollinearity in the independent variables in our 







Table 7.3 (1) – VIF tests for the independent variables of interest 
 
7.4 Sample size and random sampling 
A concern regarding our analysis is the size of the sample. For the analysis of the full sample, 
we have 95 observations. Thus, our sample is well above the central limit theorem of 30 
observations.  
However, the resilience of the statistical properties for both the event study and the cross-
sectional regressions increases with larger sample sizes (Brown & Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 
1997). Thus, we would have preferred a larger sample, but due to our strict criteria depicted 
in section 5, this was not possible. Obviously, in our analysis, there is a trade-off between a 
larger sample and enforcing the desired characters of the individual events. The strict criteria 
might increase the risk for sample selection bias, i.e., that our sample is not selected randomly 
and is not a true representation of the population, that is all firms that undertake private 
placements on OSE. However, we believe that the criteria we have used are necessary to 





8. Conclusion and further research 
The motivation for this thesis has been to research the effect private placements have on the 
issuer announcement returns on OSE and its implications for the OSE regulatory embodiment, 
corporate management, and shareholders. With a sample consisting of 95 events (private 
placements) across 73 different companies between January 2012 and January 2020, we have 
conducted an analysis by utilizing the traditional event study methodology and cross-sectional 
regressions. Our introductory results show a statistically significant negative stock price 
reaction to a private placement announcement. We find that firms on average display 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of -4.3% after the announcement of a private 
placement in a [-1, 1] event window using the Single Index Model as an estimation method. 
This is contrary to former research explaining positive announcement returns with the 
monitoring and certification hypothesis (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Wruck, 1989). Further, our 
empirical research is primarily divided into two main parts.  
In the first part, we investigate whether the announcement returns coincide with the anticipated 
price depreciation based on the discount and dilution set in the offering. We find that for every 
1% increase in the implied price depreciation, the issuer on average reports an announcement 
return of -2.329%. Implying that the market reacts more negatively to a private placement than 
the implied price depreciation would suggest. Thus, we argue that the negative announcement 
return can be perceived as an indirect flotation cost that should be accounted for when 
managers consider issuing shares through a private placement.  
In the second part, we research whether the announcement of subsequent repair issues 
influences the observed announcement returns. Our results show that when issuers announce 
a private placement without a repair issue, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is negative. 
When issuers announce a subsequent repair issue, CAR is negative but 2.68% higher. We 
propose that the difference stems from the value of the right to buy shares at a discount in the 
repair issue, which shareholders do not have if there is no repair issue. This further indicates 
that the announcement of a repair issue has value for all shareholders as it leads to higher 
announcement returns. Additionally, we believe corporate leaders might be reluctant to waive 
shareholders preemptive rights for valuable projects, thus holding a repair issue could be a 
signal to the market that the offering is more valuable.  
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Based on our inferences it is paramount that corporate leaders and board of directors 
comprehend the indirect flotation costs relating to SEO announcement returns, and their 
implications for shareholders. Every private placement is different and there are certain 
situations where swift processes benefit both the issuer and all shareholders, such as in a 
situation of financial distress. Nevertheless, private placements on average appear to be 
negative for the non-participating shareholders in the short term. The OSE is seemingly 
unambiguous to the interpretation of the shareholders’ best interest and only accounts for the 
long-term perspective. Considering contemporary research from accredited behavioral 
economists such as Kahneman (2011), it is not obvious that all investors commit to the long-
term perspective. Nor does there exist any regulation securing that the participating investors 
are long-term shareholders.  
Our understanding is that the decision to issue equity is seldom spontaneous, and as such, we 
question whether the removal of shareholders’ preemptive rights is necessary. It is a paradox 
that diverging from the equal treatment principle has become the novel approach in Norway. 
The assumption that Norway possesses a capital market with equal treatment of shareholders 
is, based on our research, a misconception. Thus, we purpose that the OSE and the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance consider regulatory changes to incentivize corporate leaders and board of 
directors to undertake SEOs that do not discriminate between shareholders. And, thus stop the 
continued liberalization of laws and regulatory requirements for private placements. 
Regarding further research, it would both be interesting and valuable to research the wealth 
transfer that occurs between non-participating and participating shareholders in private 
placements. For candidates interested in undertaking this topic we would suggest Holderness’s 
(2016) research as an excellent reference. In connection to the wealth transfer, it could also be 
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Appendices A  





Ordinary Least Squared Assumptions 
I. Linear in Parameters  
The regression must be linear in parameters, implying that a set of parameters 
(independent variables) and the error term can estimate the dependent variable of 
interest. The model allows for flexibility as the variables can be arbitrary functions 
such as natural logarithms (Wooldridge, 2012).  
II. Random Sampling  
The sample is arbitrarily chosen from the population and contains n observations.  
III. No Perfect Collinearity 
In the sample (and therefore in the population), none of the independent variables are 
constant, and there are no exact linear relationships among the independent variables. 
Thus, the independent variables of interest cannot be perfectly correlated.  
IV. Zero conditional mean 
The error u has an expected value of zero given any values of the independent 
variables. One way that MLR.4 fails is misspecification of the functional form, for 
example using y instead of log y. Omitting an important factor that is correlated with 
the independent variables also causes MLR.4 to fail. 
V. Homoskedasticity 
The error u has the same variance given any value of the explanatory variables. Thus, 
the variance in the error term is conditional on the independent variables and is the 
same regardless of the combination of outcomes for the explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2012). If it fails, then heteroskedasticity is present. For instance, if the 
variance in the error term increases as one of the explanatory variables increases, there 







Appendices C  



















A practical example of the theoretical price fall variable 
To understand the computational nature of our theoretical price fall variable and the 
implications of issuing equity with a discount we provide the following example. This 
example assumes perfect capital markets, i.e., no asymmetric information. For simplicity, we 
also assume that the issuers’ net debt (pre-issue) is zero, thus the firms’ market value of 
equity is equal to the market value of its assets.  
Consider a firm with a number of shares outstanding, N = 1000, and price per share, P = 50, 
where the market value of equity (“ME”) is given by:  
I. 𝑀𝐸 =  𝑁 𝑥 𝑃 → 1000 𝑥 50 = 50 000 
Assume that the firm issues shares (settled in cash) of 10% of the shares outstanding at a 
discount of 20% to the current share price. The value of the offering (V) can be denoted as:  
II. 𝑉 = (1000 𝑥 10%) 𝑥 (50 𝑥 [1 − 20%]) = 4 000 
The offering increases the firms’ cash balance. As such the market value of the assets, and 
thus, its market value of equity is now equal to: 
III. 𝑀𝐸 = 50 000 + 𝑉 → 50 000 + 4 000 = 54 000 
Remember from equation I. that the market value of equity is a function of the shares 
outstanding and the share price. The new number of shares is equal to:  
IV. 𝑁 = 1000 + (1000 𝑥 10%) = 1 100 
Thus, the new share price must be given by: 











= 1.818%   or  𝑇 = 20% 𝑥 (
100
100+1000





Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity  
In the cross-sectional regressions, we have tested for heteroskedasticity by applying the 
Breusch-Pagan (BP) test as suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Wooldridge (2012).  
The approach can be summarized by the following steps. First, the OLS is estimated by 
running the regression model. The R-squared values are preserved and used to test whether 
heteroskedasticity is present. If the reported p-values are below the 5% level, the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected, and heteroskedastic standard errors are 
computed.  The computation is done through the function “BP-test” in R. Based on the 
results, we computed robust standard errors for lm2, lm3, lm5, lm7, lm8, lm9, and blm4.  

















Reported statistics from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (nonparametric). 
 
